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Abstract 
Historical experience shows that one of the root causes of financial crises are the periods of high 
capital mobility. A significant number of authors agree that in the world of high capital mobility, 
sudden stops of capital inflows may occur, typically triggering financial crises. The latest 
financial crisis in the euro zone (EZ) seems to support this point of view. 
Euro adoption encouraged a capital flow bonanza to EZ periphery (Greece, Portugal, Ireland    
Spain). The sudden stop which happened in 2009, made it difficult for this countries to roll over 
debt, and thus caused a crisis.   
This paper analyses the role of large capital inflows in generating the EZ crisis. It consists of 
three parts. The first part describes the episodes of so called “capital account crises” in the 
emerging markets, which occurred during the several past decades. The second part focuses on 
the impact of capital flows on the latest EU crisis. In this this part it is statistically documented 
that the crisis in the EZ has not occurred only as a result of fiscal indiscipline of some member 
states, as it is usually believed, but have also been  a result of external, systemic reasons, such as 
the large capital flows. The third part recommends some measures of economic policy which 
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could act as prevention in a situation of reappearance of great capital inflows in the EZ 
periphery. Not only could the actual EU member states benefit from these policy measures, but 
the potential candidates, such as the Republic of Macedonia as well. After a few years, investors 
will maybe regain confidence and once more try to seek the higher returns that are available in 
periphery countries. And the recipients of the resulting capital flows will once again be 
vulnerable to sudden stops. 
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1. Capital account crisis in emerging markets  
Capital flows represent a significant factor for rapid development of emerging markets. Also 
they can feed the boom and bust cycles, when money enter and exit countries with high speed. 
Indeed, on one hand capital inflows increase economic growth in emerging markets, on the other 
hand they cause growth of asset prices, credit expansion and growth of inflation rate.  
Capital flow “bonanzas” significantly raise the risk of financial crises, since such episodes 
systematically precede sovereign debt crises, for once the capital flow stops, the country on the 
receiving end is suddenly unable to roll over the debt it has accumulated (Reinhart and Reinhart, 
2008).  
Financial crises in the past two decades significantly changed the attitude of academic 
economists about financial globalization. Those crisis, beginning from the Mexican one, are so 
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called   “capital account crises”, and they are all characterized by unsustainable deficit of current 
account, financed on various modes (Georgieva, 2011) 
The major feature of recent global crisis (2007-) was the great volatility of capital flows. The 
reasons for great capital inflows in emerging market economies, starting from the beginning of 
this century, are due to the potentials for higher growth of these economies and higher expected 
returns of the invested capital. Simultaneously, the inflows were motivated by the financial 
stability, which in that period was typical for those countries (Petkovski and Georgieva, 2012). 
This caused a large capital flow from Europe’s core to periphery, much like NAFTA helped to 
spark a surge in capital from US to Mexico in early 1990s. And the periphery countries, in turn, 
were able to benefit from tremendous influx of capital that reduced borrowing costs. Investors in 
the core were happy about the relatively high returns they were getting in the periphery and the 
periphery countries enjoyed an economic boom (Mansori,2011). 
It is necessary to notice that big capital inflow before the crisis of 2007, were not unprecedented. 
This is not the first time we’ve seen a dramatic influx of capital when countries break down 
economic and financial barriers. The same thing happened in Mexico following the creation of 
NAFTA in the early 1990s, and East Asia in the mid-to-late 1990s. Private capital inflows were 
of same size, if not even bigger in the last century 90s (Cociuba, 2011, see Figure No.1). 
When less developed countries become more integrated with the rest of the world, investors 
typically try to take advantage by sending lots of capital their way. The problem is that such 
surges in capital flows depend on the whims of international investors, and therefore have a 
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notorious tendency to come to a sudden stop if investor sentiment changes. And when that 
happens, severe financial crisis often follows (Justin and Volker, 2012).  
2. The impact of capital flows on the recent Eurozone  crisis  
Deeper analysis of the dynamics underlying the current Eurozone crisis shows that financial 
deregulation and liberalization was a major cause of the crisis in periphery countries in the 
eurozone. Financial deregulation and liberalization encouraged the development of new financial 
instruments and derivatives and allowed banks in core eurozone countries to increase leverage 
and boost loanable funds, spurring a real estate and consumption boom. This boom was also 
made possible by the adoption of the Euro in the context of greater European financial and 
economic integration, which lowered the currency risk in periphery countries and permitted 
interest rates to converge towards a much lower level in core countries. The interest rates in the 
eurozone’s core and periphery rapidly converged, and by 2004 there was no difference in interest 
rates of the periphery countries and that of Germany.  
Europe’s common currency area caused the eurozone periphery to incur large amounts of 
international debt. One of the principal goals of Europe’s common currency has always been to 
promote greater financial market integration among member countries. It was expected that the 
common currency would make it easier for investors of certain euro countries to find good 
investment opportunities in other euro countries since they would no longer have to worry about 
fickle exchange rates. One of the perceived benefits of the euro was to make it easier for capital 
to flow from countries with abundant capital, and thus relatively low returns to investments, to 
countries that were relatively capital-poor, and that therefore offered high returns on investments. 
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In the case of Europe, the capital-rich countries were at the core of the eurozone. The adoption of 
the euro by periphery countries in 1999 allowed lenders in the eurozone’s core to take advantage 
of relatively high rates of return in the periphery (Mansori, 2011 ). These capital flows fueled a 
peripheral boom, and sharply rising wages and prices in the eurozone’s periphery relative to euro 
zone core. 
The importance of the Euro can be demonstrated by differences in financial indicators between 
eurozone countries on one hand and European countries on the other hand that did not use the 
Euro: Bilateral bank holdings and transactions among eurozone countries increased by roughly 
40 percent following the adoption of the Euro. In contrast, bank holdings and transactions only 
increased by 25 to 30 percent if the three countries that did not adopt the Euro (the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden) are included within the eurozone countries. Thus, the increase 
of transactions was significantly smaller in countries which did not adopt the Euro, underscoring 
the impact of the common currency (Justin and Volker, 2012). 
In this context we can summarize that both, financial deregulation and the fall in interest rates, 
contributed to large inflows of capital from core countries into periphery countries. Abundant 
credit from core countries triggered economic boom in periphery countries, driven largely by 
rising consumption. Yet, with rising wages and growth increasingly driven by unsustainably high 
domestic consumption, periphery countries lost export competitiveness and the manufacturing 
sector declined. At the same time, core countries’ competitiveness and their external surpluses 
improved, as a result of wage restraint and the relative undervaluation of the Euro compared to 
the earlier national currencies (Justin and Volker, 2012). 
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The flow of capital into a country is measured by its current account deficit - a negative current 
account deficit means that the country is the recipient of international lending, while a surplus 
indicates that capital is being invested abroad. The flow of capital into a country is measured by 
its current account deficit; a negative current account deficit means that the country is the 
recipient of international lending, while a surplus indicates that capital is being invested abroad. 
Current account deficits of the periphery countries grew enormously in the years following euro 
adoption in 1999, while the core countries became substantial sources of capital outflows 
(Mansori, 2011, see Figure No. 2). 
Table No. 1 presented budget balances and current account balances during the period after the 
adoption of the euro and before the worldwide financial crisis, as % of GDP. 
The beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, despite the solid economic fundamentals in 
emerging market economies, for the lack of liquidity, made the international banks and investors 
to withdraw portfolio investments from these economies. The sudden stop which happened in 
2009, made it difficult for this countries to roll over debt, and thus caused a crisis. Euro adoption 
made it impossible for the periphery countries to deal with sudden stop to capital flows. These 
countries could no longer issue sovereign debt in their own currency. Such circumstances made 
these countries vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment. Because of the common currency, 
periphery counties lacked the tools to manage their balance of payments (Ferry and Merler, 
2012). Italy saw 160 billion euros exit in 2011, while Spain lost 100 billion euros, in a mixture of 
bank withdrawals and sales of government and corporate bonds.  Foreign bank deposits have 
fallen 64% in Greece, 55% in Ireland and 37% in Portugal; in Italy, the fall is 34% and Spain 
13%. Foreign government bond holdings have dropped 56% in Greece, 18% in Ireland and 25% 
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in Portugal; in Italy the fall is 12% and Spain 18% (The Economist, 2012). Figure No. 3 reports 
for each month the countries found to be in a sudden stop.  
With the beginning of crisis, especially with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financial 
institutions from developed countries stricken by the crisis, started to massively withdraw the 
capital from their affiliates located in emerging market economies, which caused a negative 
influence over the foreign exchange reserves and national currencies and even over the liquidity 
crisis in these economies. 
Euro area asset and liability financial flows fell sharply, from 20% of GDP in 2007 to less than 
5% of GDP in 2008. Banks also decreased their assets held abroad. As a results of the liquidity 
shortage in the global banking sector, euro area banks went from being net borrowers to being 
net lenders in last quarter of 2008 and for most of 2009 (ECB, 2012). 
According to analyses, global crisis started because debt in the eurozone’s periphery became so 
large that investors feared that entire countries were at risk of default (Mansori, 2011). Financial 
markets lost confidence in the creditworthiness of Greece and other periphery countries and 
interest rates on government bonds soared to levels that forced the governments of these 
countries to seek bailouts from international community, including the European Community and 
the IMF (Justin and Volker, 2012). 
The increase of public debt which resulted from these bailouts was further compounded by the 
ballooning of government deficits resulting from the sharp fall in revenue as a result of the drop 
in output and the adoption of stimulus packages to counteract the impact of the crisis.  Figure 
No. 4 show the evolution of public debt burden following the crisis. 
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3. Economic policy measures as prevention against future large capital inflows in the 
EZ periphery 
Some believe that the crisis was fundamentally caused by irresponsible behavior by governments 
and individuals in EZ periphery-government deficit and debt in these countries were so large that 
once the Great Recession hit, investors lost confidence in the ability of those countries to remain 
solvent. So, they tried to dump the bonds from those countries, triggering the crises. Many 
analysts came to a conclusion that the crisis itself was caused by fiscal profligacy in periphery 
countries. According to these analyses, fiscal discipline will allow euro zone to regain strength, 
without further need for fiscal stimulus (Justin and Volker, 2012). 
We have to take into consideration that fiscal contraction during recession will typically fail to 
meet deficit reduction, because the austerity makes the recession worse.   
But, we have to notice that, the relationship between budget deficit and crisis is weaker. Some of 
the crisis countries whit large fiscal deficit did not experience crisis. So capital flow bonanzas 
and sudden stops, pushed periphery countries toward crisis. Many analysts and observers have 
put forward that the euro crisis is a balance-of-payments crisis at least as much as a fiscal crisis. 
(e.g. Carney 2012, Giavazzi and Spaventa 2011, Sinn 2012, Wolf 2011). Crisis in the Euro zone 
has not occurred only as a result of fiscal indiscipline of some member states, as it is usually 
believed, but has also been a result of external, systemic reasons, such as the large capital flows. 
If the crisis is due primarily to local causes, than the best predictor of crisis is government deficit 
and debt. If the reason is large inflow of capital, than a better predictor of the crisis would be 
large current account deficit, which necessarily happens when there is a capital flow bonanza. 
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If crisis is due to the irresponsible behavior of the periphery countries, than they must pay the 
price, because bailout of the periphery countries may encourage future irresponsible behavior. 
But if the crisis was mainly a result of forces outside the control of the EZ periphery countries, it 
is not appropriate to ask them for fiscal restrictions. All of the members of the EZ have enjoyed 
the benefits of the common currency. The large capital flows from the EZ core to the periphery 
during the years 1999-2007 are evidence that investors in the core EZ counties enjoyed and took 
full advantage of the high returns they could get on new investment opportunities in the 
periphery. They have been able to enjoy significantly stronger exports for the past 10 years 
thanks to the euro. Since all members benefit from the common currency, all will have to pay the 
price of dealing with its vulnerabilities.   
It doesn’t seem appropriate that the burden of solving the crisis should be placed on periphery 
countries, while the benefits of the common currency were shared by both the core and the 
periphery. In this context substantial assistance from the core to the periphery in response to the 
crisis can be viewed as the responsibility of the core EZ counties.  
Confronted whit a public debt crisis peripheral countries have been forced by the Euro zone to 
impose harsh austerity. Peripheral countries have been forced to accept IMF conditionality but 
whit out an IMF loan. Better policy alternatives are available, but they involve radical social and 
economic change. According to Lapavitsas (2010). The first alternative available to peripheral 
countries is austerity accompanied with further liberalization. This means adopt austerity by 
cutting waged and reducing public borrowing requirements. This strategic alternative will 
achieve stabilization through recession, imposing huge costs on working people. It offers little 
prospect of sustained growth in the future.  
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The second alternative is radical reform of the Euro zone. It would involve greater fiscal freedom 
by member states, enlarged European budget, fiscal transfers from rich to poor, support for 
wages, protection for employment etc.  
The third option is radical exit from Euro zone. The aim of this strategy is reintroduction of the 
national currencies and internal devaluation, which would revive export. But there would be 
losses for those servicing debt abroad, including banks, and workers would face wage declines. 
Devaluation requires a redistribution of spending, with the creditors spending more, while the 
debtors spend less. Second, it requires a real depreciation on the part of the debtors, a real 
appreciation on the part of the creditors — that is, wages and prices in the eurozone’s periphery 
must fall relative to those in euro zone core (Krugman, 2011).  
If we suppose that euro zone emerges from this crisis, and member countries still exclusively 
using the euro. In this case there will once again be capital flows from the EZ core to the 
periphery. After few years investors will regain confidence and once more try to seek out the 
higher returns that are available in the periphery countries, and recipient countries will once 
again be vulnerable to a sudden stop. And they will once again lack policy tools to deal with it 
when it happens. In this context the question is: can anything be done to fundamentally make the 
euro zone system more stable? What kind of measures of economic policy could act as 
prevention in a situation of reappearance of great capital inflows in the EZ periphery?  
One of the reasons that this crisis has gotten so bad is that the EZ periphery countries lacked any 
tools to deal with it, largely because in common currency area they have no central bank to fall 
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beck on in the event of liquidity crunch. This problem can be solved through number of steps, ex 
if ECB provide unlimited liquidity to any EZ country that need it.   
The current crisis has led to significant changes in patterns of cross-border financial flows and 
has led to increasing attention being paid to cross-border financial flows and recognition of their 
importance for macroeconomic and financial stability (ECB, 2012). It is well known that, 
countries with a very high degree of financial openness are more exposed to periods of higher 
tension in the financial markets, leading to repatriation of foreign investment capital. External 
financial flows can be volatile and easy reversible.  
In this context it is necessary to emphasize that sudden stops may happen even when a country is 
following all the right macroeconomic policies. The Mexican and East Asian financial crises of 
the 1990s are good examples of that. In the case of the eurozone, the sudden stop to capital flows 
in 2009 indiscriminately hit all of the periphery countries, regardless of how well they had 
managed their finances (Mansori,2011). Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain experienced 
significant private capital inflows from 2002 to 2007-9, followed by unambiguous and rather 
sudden outflows.  
Global financial crisis also provided some lessons in macroeconomic discipline. Despite the 
undeniably beneficial effects of financial integration on growth and on general societal welfare, 
imbalanced capital flows imply significant risk for economies whenever they are coupled with 
unsustainable domestic policies. Balanced and sustainable macroeconomic policies are helps to 
enable countries to attract stable and balanced capital inflows, which are conductive in long-run 
growth of the economy (ECB, 2012). 
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Capital controls would also have to be imposed on the capital account to prevent outflow of 
capital. (ex. each international transaction to be subject to a small transaction tax). This will 
make investors think more careful and move more slowly both into and out of international 
capital markets. A significant number of studies confirm that capital controls represent a useful 
instrument in different situations: for stabilization of volatile short-term capital flows, for 
increasing the independance of  monetary policy, for  changing  the composition of capital flows 
in favour of FDI, and for  reducing  the pressure on the  exchange rate (Petkovski, Georgieva, 
2012).  
Since the introduction of single currency in 1999 European Monetary Union has played a key 
role in the process of financial integration in the global area. The global financial crisis (2007) 
interrupted the process of steady global integration (ECB, 2012). 
According to some economists, the global economy is at a crossroads. One path leads to 
regulatory integration on a global scale, creating national economies with extremely close ties. 
The second path leads to a world where national economies are more isolated and rely on 
domestic consumption for growth countries would becomes isolationist, continuing to retreat 
from international capital markets and concentrate on domestic growth (Francis,2012).  
Global financial crisis actually presents crisis of globalization. Increased internationalization of 
capital flows, caused the effect of contagion, and raised the fears of possible reaction against 
financial globalization and integration.  
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Conclusion 
The root cause of the recent Eurozone crisis was unrestricted financial deregulation and 
liberalization. It is well known that in the world of high capital mobility, sudden stops of capital 
inflows may occur, typically triggering financial crises. The common currency promoted greater 
financial market integration between member countries, and pushed Eurozone peripheral 
countries to incur large amounts of international debt. Financial deregulation and the fall in 
interest rates encouraged large-scale capital flows from EZ core to periphery. Capital flows 
fueled a peripheral boom, and sharply rising wages and prices in the EZ periphery relative to EZ 
core.   
With the beginning of the global financial crisis, international banks and investors from the EZ 
core, started massively to withdraw capital from the periphery countries, which had negative 
impact on the foreign exchange reserves in these economies. The sudden stop, which happened 
in 2009, made it difficult for the periphery countries to roll over their debt, and thus caused a 
liquidity crisis.   
According to some economists, the crisis was fundamentally caused by irresponsible behavior of 
the governments in periphery countries. But, if the crisis is due primarily to local causes (i.e. by 
fiscal profligacy), than fiscal discipline will allow the Eurozone to regain its strength, without 
further need for fiscal stimulus. However, we have to underline that fiscal consolidation and 
restriction during the recession, would make the recession even worse.   
If the crisis is indeed the result of the irresponsible behavior of the periphery countries, than they 
have to be forced by the EU to impose harsh austerity, cutting wages and reducing public   
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spending. Another possible option is exit from the EZ, reintroduction of national currencies and 
internal devaluation. Internal devaluation would revive exports in those countries, but they would 
suffer losses from servicing foreign currency debts. All these options have their serious 
drawbacks. 
In this paper we argued that the EZ crisis has not occurred only as a result of fiscal indiscipline, 
but have also been a result of external, systemic reasons, such as the large capital flows. Euro-
adoption not only set the stage for the crisis by encouraging a capital flow bonanza to the EZ 
periphery; it also made it impossible for the periphery countries to deal with the sudden stop to 
those capital flow (Mansori, 2011).   
An interesting question in the context of capital flows to periphery countries is what will happen 
in few years if investors regain confidence and once more try to seek out the higher returns that 
are available in the periphery countries. That means that recipient countries will once again be 
vulnerable to a sudden stop. Periphery countries have to increase their attention on international 
capital inflows and to recognize their impact on macroeconomic and financial stability. Sound 
macroeconomic and financial policies would help peripheral countries to attract stable and 
balanced capital inflows, which are sustainable in the long-run. 
 
 
 
 
Capital Flows and the Eurozone Crisis   15 
 
References: 
1. Buiter W., Michels J. and Rahbari E. (2011): “Making Sense of Target Imbalances”, 
VoxEU.org, 6 September. 
2. Calvo G. and Loo-Kung R. (2008): “Rapid and Large Liquidity Funding for Emerging 
Markets”, VoxEU.org, 10 December. 
3. Carney M. (2012): "Remarks at the World Economic Forum", VoxEu.org, 28 January. 
4. Cociuba S.E. (2011): “Upstream Capital Flows: Why Emerging Markets Send Savings to 
Advanced Economies”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Research Publication, Vol.6, 
No.5, May. 
5. European Central Bank ECB (2012): “Euro Area Cross-Border Financial Flows, Monthly 
Bulletin, February. 
6. Ferry J. and Merler S. (2012): “Sudden Stops in the Eurozone”, VoxEU.org,  2 April. 
7. Francis D. (2013): “Is the End of Globalization?” The Fiscal Times, available at:  
www.thefiscaltimes.com, February. 
8. Georgieva V. (2011): “Financial Liberalization and Financial Stability”, Makedonska 
Riznica, Kumanovo. 
9. Giavazzi, F. and Spaventa L. (2011): "Why the Current Account May Matter in a 
Monetary Union: Lessons From the Financial Crisis in the Euro Area", CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 8008. 
Capital Flows and the Eurozone Crisis   16 
 
10. Justin Y.L. and Volker T. (2012): “The Crisis in the Eurozone”, The World Financial 
Review, Walden University. 
11. Krugman P. (2012): “September Euro Update: The Perils of Pointless Pain”, The New 
York Times, September.  
12. Lapavitsas C. at al. (2010): “Eurozone Crisis: Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbor” 
Research on Money and Finance, March. 
13. Mansori K. (2011): “Why Greece, Spain, and Ireland Aren’t to Blame for Europe’s 
Woes,” in New Republic, October.  
14. Massa I., Keane J. and Kennan J. (2012): “The Eurozone Crisis and Developing 
Countries”, Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper, March. 
15. Mody A. and Bornhorst, F. (2012): “TARGET Imbalances: Financing the Capital-
Account Reversal in Europe,”, VoxEU.org, 7 March. 
16. Petkovski M. and Georgieva V. (2012): “The Impact of Capital Controls on Maintaining 
Macroeconomic and Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies” TASAM- 
Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies.  
17. Reinhart C. and Reinhart M.V. (2008): “From Capital Flow Bonanza to Financial Crash, 
VoxEU.org. 23 October. 
18. Sinn H. (2012): "The European Balance of Payment Crisis", CESifo Forum, Vol. 13. 
Capital Flows and the Eurozone Crisis   17 
 
19. The Economist (2012): “The Eurozone Crisis - Capital Flight”, Buttonwood’ notebook, 
May 21st, available at www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood. 
20. The Streetlight (2011): “What Really Caused the Eurozone Crisis?” available at www. 
streetlightblog.blogspot.com, September. 
21. Tornell, A. and Westermann F. (2011), “Greece: The Sudden Stop That Wasn’t”, 
VoxEU.org, 28 September. 
22. Wolf M. (2011), "Merkozy Failed to Save the Eurozone", Financial Times, 6 December. 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Flows and the Eurozone Crisis   18 
 
Table 1 
Fiscal and current account balances as % of GDP in the EZ countries (2000-07 average)  
Fiscal balance CA balance 
Country                                        2000-07ave Country                               2000-07ave 
Greece                                                       -5,4% Portugal                                                    -9,4% 
Portugal                                                    -3,7% Greece                                                      -8,4% 
Italy                                                           -2,9% Spain                                                        -5,8% 
 France                                                      -2,7% Ireland                                                      -1,8% 
 Germany                                                  -2,2%             Italy                                                          -1,3% 
 Austria                                                     -1,6% France                                                        0,4% 
  Netherlands                                             -0,6%         Austria                                                       1,6% 
  Belgium                                                  -0,4% Belgium                                                     3,0% 
Spain                                                          0,3% Germany                                                    3,2% 
  Ireland                                                     1,5% Netherlands                                               5,4% 
Luxemburg                                                 2,3% Finland                                                       5,9% 
Finland                                                       4,1% Luxemburg                                              10,6% 
The Streetlight, 2011. 
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Figure No. 1 
Private Capital Flows in Emerging Market Economies as % of GDP (quarterly date for 42 
counties) 
 
Source: Cociuba,2011 
Note: The emerging market economies consist of Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Bugaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Paru, Philippines, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, 
Ukraie and Uruguay 
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Figure No. 2 
Current Account Balance in the EZ countries (as % of GDP) 
 
Mansori, 2011. 
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Figure No. 3 
Episodes of Sudden Stops 
 
Ferry and Merler, 2012. 
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Figure No. 4 
Evolution of General Government Deficit (as percent of GDP) in some EZ countries (2000-
2011) 
 
Justin and Volker, 2012. 
